



# Enterprise Anti-Virus Protection

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Dennis Technology Labs

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This report aims to compare the effectiveness of anti-malware products provided by well-known security companies.

The products were exposed to internet threats that were live during the test period. This

exposure was carried out in a realistic way, closely reflecting a customer's experience.

These results reflect what would have happened if a user was using one of the products and visited an infected website.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Products tested

Product	Protected	Legitimate accuracy	Total Accuracy
Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Windows	100	100%	100%
Symantec Endpoint Protection	100	100%	100%
Trend Micro OfficeScan and Intrusion Defense Firewall	95	95%	93%
McAfee VirusScan, HIPs and SiteAdvisor	98	87%	88%
Microsoft SystemCenter Endpoint Protection	53	100%	64%

**Products highlighted in green were the most accurate, scoring 85 per cent or more for Total accuracy. Those in yellow scored less than 85 but 75 or more. Products shown in red scored less than 75 per cent. For exact percentages see I. Total Accuracy Ratings on page 4.**

### *Product names*

The products tested in this report were the latest versions available from each vendor on the date that the test started.

These are listed in Appendix C: Product versions on page 19.

Specific 'build numbers' are available for those who wish to ascertain the exact versions that were used for testing.

- **The effectiveness of anti-malware security suites varies widely.**

Most products were compromised at least twice. The most effective protected against between 98 to 100 per cent of threats, while the least effective (Microsoft System Center Endpoint Protection) was compromised by 47 per cent of the threats.

- **Blocking malicious sites based on reputation is an effective approach.**

Those products that prevented users from visiting the malicious sites in the first place gained a significant advantage. If the malware can't download onto the victim's computer then the anti-malware software faces less of an ongoing challenge.

- **Some anti-malware programs are too harsh when evaluating legitimate software**

Most of the products did not bother users when installing legitimate software. McAfee's product was the most paranoid and onerous to use, while those from Kaspersky Lab and Microsoft scored 100 per cent.

- **Which was the best product?**

The most accurate programs were Symantec Endpoint Protection Enterprise Edition and Kaspersky Endpoint Security For Windows. Both win AAA awards.

Simon Edwards, Dennis Technology Labs, 17th December 2014

## CONTENTS

Executive summary .....	1
Contents .....	3
1. Total Accuracy Ratings .....	4
2. Protection Ratings.....	6
3. Protection Scores .....	8
4. Protection Details .....	9
5. Legitimate Software Ratings.....	10
6. The Tests.....	13
7. Test Details .....	14
8. Conclusions.....	17
Appendix A: Terms Used .....	18
Appendix B: FAQs.....	19
Appendix C: Product versions .....	20


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## I. TOTAL ACCURACY RATINGS

The total accuracy ratings provide a way to judge how effectively the security programs work by looking at a single graph.

Anti-malware software should not just detect threats. It should allow legitimate software to run unhindered as well.

The results below take into account how accurately the programs treated threats and handled legitimate software.



**The total accuracy ratings take into account successes and failures with both malware and legitimate applications.**

We ran two distinct tests: one that measured how the products handled internet threats and one that measured how they handled legitimate programs.

The ideal product would block all threats and allow all legitimate applications.

When a product fails to protect the system against a threat it is compromised. When it warns against, or even blocks, legitimate software then it generates a 'false positive' result.

Products gain points for stopping threats successfully and for allowing users to install and run legitimate software. Products lose points for failing to stop threats and when they handle legitimate files incorrectly.

Each product then receives a final rating based on its performance in each of the 'threat' and 'legitimate software' tests.

These results show a combined accuracy rating, taking into account each product's performance with both threats and non-malicious software.

There is a maximum possible score of 1,140 and a minimum of -1,340.

See 5. *Legitimate Software Ratings* on page 10 for detailed results and an explanation on how the false positive ratings are calculated.

## TOTAL ACCURACY RATINGS

Product	Total Accuracy Rating	Percentage	Award
Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Windows	1140	100%	AAA
Symantec Endpoint Protection	1136	100%	AAA
Trend Micro OfficeScan and Intrusion Defense Firewall	1058	93%	AA
McAfee VirusScan, HIPs and SiteAdvisor	1006	88%	A
Microsoft SystemCenter Endpoint Protection	728	64%	-

### ■ Awards

The following products win Dennis Technology Labs awards:



Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Windows  
Symantec Endpoint Protection Enterprise Edition

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Trend Micro OfficeScan and Intrusion Defense Firewall

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McAfee VirusScan, HIPs and SiteAdvisor

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## 2. PROTECTION RATINGS

The following results show how each product was scored for its accuracy in handling malware only. They do not take into account false positives.

### ■ Neutralize (+1)

If the product terminated a running threat the result was a neutralization. The product protected the system and was awarded one point.

### ■ Neutralize, complete remediation (+2)

The product was awarded a bonus point if, in addition to stopping the malware, it removed all hazardous traces of the attack.


### ■ Defense (+3)

Products that prevented threats from running 'defended' the system and were awarded three points.

### ■ Compromise (-5)

If the threat ran uninhibited on the system, or the system was damaged, five points were deducted.

The best possible protection rating is 300 and the worst is -500.



**With protection ratings we award products extra points for completely blocking a threat, while removing points when they are compromised by a threat.**

### How we calculate the ratings

The protection ratings are calculated like this:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Protection rating} = & \\ & (3x \text{ number of defenses}) + \\ & (1x \text{ number of neutralizations} + \\ & (1x \text{ number of complete remediations})) + \\ & (-5x \text{ number of compromises}) \end{aligned}$$

Note that the 'number of full remediations' value refers only to cases of neutralization for which full

remediation was achieved. Full remediation is automatically assumed for all cases of 'defense'.

The score weighting gives credit to products that deny malware any opportunity to tamper with the system and penalizes heavily those that fail.

It is possible to apply your own weightings if you feel that compromises should be penalized more or less heavily. To do so use the results from 4. *Protection Details* on page 9.


## PROTECTION RATINGS

<b>Product</b>	<b>Protection Rating</b>
Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Windows	300
Symantec Endpoint Protection	300
McAfee VirusScan, HIPs and SiteAdvisor	273
Trend Micro OfficeScan and Intrusion Defense Firewall	258
Microsoft SystemCenter Endpoint Protection	-112

### 3. PROTECTION SCORES

The following illustrates the general level of protection, combining defended and neutralized results.

There is no distinction made between these different levels of protection. Either a system is protected or it is not.



The protection scores simply indicate how many times each product prevented a threat from compromising the system.

#### PROTECTION SCORES

Product	Protected Scores
Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Windows	100
Symantec Endpoint Protection	100
McAfee VirusScan, HIPs and SiteAdvisor	98
Trend Micro OfficeScan and Intrusion Defense Firewall	95
Microsoft System Center Endpoint Protection	53


(Average: 89 per cent)



## 4. PROTECTION DETAILS

The security products provided different levels of protection. When a product *defended* against a threat, it prevented the malware from gaining a foothold on the target system.

A threat might have been able to exploit or infect the system and, in some cases, the product *neutralized* it either after the exploit ran or later. When it couldn't the system was *compromised*.



The graph shows details on how the products handled the attacks. They are ordered according to their protection scores. For overall protection scores see 3. Protection Scores on page 8.

### PROTECTION DETAILS

Product	Defended	Neutralized	Compromised	Protected
Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Windows	100	0	0	100
Symantec Endpoint Protection	100	0	0	100
McAfee VirusScan, HIPs and SiteAdvisor	89	9	2	98
Trend Micro OfficeScan and Intrusion Defense Firewall	94	1	5	95
Microsoft System Center Endpoint Protection	33	20	47	53


## 5. LEGITIMATE SOFTWARE RATINGS

The legitimate software accuracy ratings provide a way to judge how effectively the security programs handle non-malicious software by looking at a single graph.

Anti-malware software should allow legitimate software to run unhindered. These results take

into account the level of any interaction that the product demands of the user, as well as the prevalence of the legitimate program.

To understand how we calculate these ratings see 5.3 Accuracy ratings on page 12.



**When a product misclassified a popular program it faced a stronger penalty than if the file was more obscure.**

### LEGITIMATE SOFTWARE RATINGS

Product	Accuracy Rating
Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Windows	840
Microsoft System Center Endpoint Protection	840
Symantec Endpoint Protection	836
Trend Micro OfficeScan and Intrusion Defense Firewall	800
McAfee VirusScan, HIPS and SiteAdvisor	733

### ■ 5.1 Interaction ratings

A security product needs to be able to protect the system from threats, while allowing legitimate software to work properly. When legitimate software is misclassified as malware a false positive is generated.

In an effort to protect the system some security products will ask the user questions when it encounters software that it is not certain is either fully legitimate or definitely malware.

When measuring how effective each product is we take into account all of the likely outcomes, whether the product allows, blocks or asks different types of questions. In each case a score is allocated.

A product gains top marks if it allows legitimate software to install without requiring the user to answer questions or otherwise interact. It loses points the more interaction is required and the less accurately it behaves.

If a product actually generates a genuine false positive (e.g. “software is malicious”) it is penalized heavily.

The results grid below shows the most likely possibilities, along with some outcomes that could only happen if a product was not working properly (e.g. A5 – Object is safe but is blocked automatically).

		Interaction					
		None (allowed)	Click to allow (default allow)	Click to allow/block (no recommendation)	Click to block (default block)	None (blocked)	
Classification	Object is safe	2	1.5	1			A
	Object is unknown	2	1	0.5	0	-0.5	B
	Object is not classified	2	0.5	0	-0.5	-1	C
	Object is suspicious	0.5	0	-0.5	-1	-1.5	D
	Object is unwanted	0	-0.5	-1	-1.5	-2	E
	Object is malicious				-2	-2	F
		1	2	3	4	5	

**Top marks to products that are accurate; those that ask too many questions or are overly suspicious are penalized.**

#### LEGITIMATE SOFTWARE INCIDENTS

Product	Interaction	Total
McAfee VirusScan, HIPs and SiteAdvisor	Click to block (default block)	1
	None (blocked)	6
Trend Micro OfficeScan and Intrusion Defense Firew all	None (blocked)	2
Symantec Endpoint Protection	None (blocked)	1

## ■ 5.2 Prevalence ratings

The prevalence of each piece of software is significant. If a security product interferes with common applications then the situation is more serious than if it does so with rare ones. That said, it is usually expected that anti-malware programs should not interfere with any legitimate software.

The programs selected for the legitimate software testing were organized into five groups:

Very High Impact; High Impact; Medium Impact; Low Impact; and Very Low Impact.

The table below shows the relative importance of each group expressed as a numerical value. A Very High Impact application is ranked as being five times more significant than a Very Low Impact program.

### LEGITIMATE SOFTWARE PREVALENCE RATING MODIFIERS

Impact category	Rating modifier
Very High Impact	5
High Impact	4
Medium Impact	3
Low Impact	2
Very Low Impact	1

These categories were attributed to software programs based on their individual weekly download numbers as reported by third-party download sites including Download.com at the time of testing.

Files were downloaded from their original sources, excluding third-party download sites, such as Download.com, wherever possible. This was to reduce the chances that the software had been altered in any way, perhaps having potentially unwanted add-ons included with the installer.

The presence of potentially unwanted add-ons transforms the legitimate software into a product that could be blocked or altered justifiably by anti-malware software. As such they are not suitable for this legitimate software test.

The ranges for these categories, in terms of weekly downloads, are recorded in the table Legitimate Software Prevalence Categories.

### LEGITIMATE SOFTWARE PREVALENCE CATEGORIES

Impact category	Prevalence
Very High Impact	>20,000
High Impact	1,000 - 20,000
Medium Impact	100 - 999
Low Impact	25 - 99
Very Low Impact	< 25

## ■ 5.3 Accuracy ratings

The legitimate software accuracy ratings are calculated by multiplying together the interaction and prevalence ratings.

$$\text{accuracy rating} = \text{number of programs} \times (\text{interaction rating} \times \text{prevalence rating})$$

For example, if a product allows 10 legitimate, Medium Impact programs to install without any interference then its rating would be calculated like this:

$$\text{accuracy rating} = 10 \times (2 \times 3) = 60$$

This formula creates the impact-weighted accuracy ratings used in the graph 5. Legitimate Software Ratings on page 10.

## ■ 5.4 Distribution of impact categories

Products that scored highest were the most accurate when handling the legitimate applications used in the test.

The best theoretical score possible is 1,000, while the worst would be -1,000 (assuming that all applications were classified as Very High Impact).

In fact the distribution of applications in the impact categories was not restricted only to Very High Impact. The table below shows the true distribution:

### LEGITIMATE SOFTWARE CATEGORY FREQUENCY

Prevalence Rating	Frequency
Very High Impact	58
High Impact	20
Medium Impact	11
Low Impact	6
Very Low Impact	5

## 6. THE TESTS

### ■ 6.1 The threats

Providing a realistic user experience was important in order to illustrate what really happens when a user encounters a threat on the internet.

For example, in these tests web-based malware was accessed by visiting an original, infected website using a web browser, and not downloaded from a CD or internal test website.

All target systems were fully exposed to the threats. This means that any exploit code was allowed to run, as were other malicious files. They were run and permitted to perform exactly as they were designed to, subject to checks made by the installed security software.

A minimum time period of five minutes was provided to allow the malware an opportunity to act.

### ■ 6.2 Test rounds

Tests were conducted in rounds. Each round recorded the exposure of every product to a specific threat. For example, in 'round one' each of the products was exposed to the same malicious website.

At the end of each round the test systems were completely reset to remove any possible trace of malware before the next test began.

### ■ 6.3 Monitoring

Close logging of the target systems was necessary to gauge the relative successes of the malware and the anti-malware software. This included recording activity such as network traffic, the creation of files and processes and changes made to important files.

### ■ 6.4 Levels of protection

The products displayed different levels of protection. Sometimes a product would prevent a threat from executing, or at least making any significant changes to the target system.

In other cases a threat might be able to perform some tasks on the target (such as exploiting a security vulnerability or executing a malicious program), after which the security product would intervene and remove some or all of the malware.

Finally, a threat may be able to bypass the security product and carry out its malicious tasks unhindered. It may even be able to disable the security software.

Occasionally Windows' own protection system might handle a threat while the anti-virus program ignored it. Another outcome is that the malware may crash for various reasons.

The different levels of protection provided by each product were recorded following analysis of the log files.

If malware failed to perform properly in a given incident, perhaps because of the very presence of the security product, rather than any specific defending action that the product took, the product was given the benefit of the doubt and a Defended result was recorded.

If the test system was damaged, becoming hard to use following an attempted attack, this was counted as a compromise even if the active parts of the malware had eventually been removed by the product.

### ■ 6.5 Types of protection

All of the products tested provided two main types of protection: real-time and on-demand. Real-time protection monitors the system constantly in an attempt to prevent a threat from gaining access.

On-demand protection is essentially a 'virus scan' that is run by the user at an arbitrary time.

The test results note each product's behavior when a threat is introduced and afterwards. The real-time protection mechanism was monitored throughout the test, while an on-demand scan was run towards the end of each test to measure how safe the product determined the system to be.

Manual scans were run only when a tester determined that malware had made an interaction with the target system. In other words, if the security product claimed to block the attack at the initial stage, and the monitoring logs supported this claim, the case was considered closed and a Defended result was recorded.

## 7. TEST DETAILS

### ■ 7.1 The targets

To create a fair testing environment, each product was installed on a clean Windows 7 Professional 64-bit target system. The operating system was updated with Service Pack 1 (SP1), although no later patches or updates were applied.

We test with Windows 7 SP1 due to the high prevalence of internet threats that work with this operating system. The prevalence of these threats suggests that there are many systems with this level of patching currently connected to the internet.

At the time of testing Windows 7 was being used heavily by consumers and businesses.

According to Net Applications, which monitors the popularity of operating systems and web browsers, Windows 7 accounted for 48 per cent of the desktop operating system market. It was the market leader, with Windows XP coming a close second (29 per cent).

Windows 8 and Windows Vista came a distant third and fifth (11 per cent and three per cent) respectively<sup>1</sup>. Mac OS X came fourth.

Our aim is to test the security product and not the protection provided by keeping systems completely up to date with patches and other mechanisms. Patching will inevitably improve the security of the system and readers are advised to keep all software updated.

A selection of legitimate but vulnerable software was pre-installed on the target systems. These posed security risks, as they contained known security issues. They included versions of Adobe Flash Player, Adobe Reader and Java.

A different security product was then installed on each system. Each product's update mechanism was used to download the latest version with the most recent definitions and other elements.

Due to the dynamic nature of the tests, which were carried out in real-time with live malicious websites, the products' update systems were

allowed to run automatically and were also run manually before each test round was carried out.

The products were also allowed to 'call home' should they be programmed to query databases in real-time. Some products might automatically upgrade themselves during the test. At any given time of testing, the very latest version of each program was used.

Each target systems was a physical PC, not a virtual machine, and was connected to the internet via its own virtual network (VLAN) to avoid cross-infection of malware.

### ■ 7.2 Threat selection

The malicious web links (URLs) used in the tests were not provided by any anti-malware vendor.

They were picked from lists generated by Dennis Technology Labs' own malicious site detection system, which uses popular search engine keywords submitted to Google. It analyses sites that are returned in the search results from a number of search engines and adds them to a database of malicious websites.

In all cases, a control system (Verification Target System - VTS) was used to confirm that the URLs linked to actively malicious sites.

Malicious URLs and files are not shared with any vendors during the testing process.

### ■ 7.3 Test stages

There were three main stages in each individual test:

1. Introduction
2. Observation
3. Remediation

During the *Introduction* stage, the target system was exposed to a threat. Before the threat was introduced, a snapshot was taken of the system. This created a list of Registry entries and files on the hard disk. The threat was then introduced.

Immediately after the system's exposure to the threat, the *Observation* stage is reached. During this time, which typically lasted at least 10 minutes, the tester monitored the system both visually and using a range of third-party tools.

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<sup>1</sup> Net Market Share (Net Applications), <http://www.netmarketshare.com/>

The tester reacted to pop-ups and other prompts according to the directives described below (see *7.5 Observation and intervention* below).

In the event that hostile activity to other internet users was observed, such as when spam was being sent by the target, this stage was cut short.

The *Observation* stage concluded with another system snapshot. This 'exposed' snapshot was compared to the original 'clean' snapshot and a report generated. The system was then rebooted.

The *Remediation* stage is designed to test the products' ability to clean an infected system. If it defended against the threat in the *Observation* stage then we skipped it. An on-demand scan was run on the target, after which a 'scanned' snapshot was taken. This was compared to the original 'clean' snapshot and a report was generated.

All log files, including the snapshot reports and the product's own log files, were recovered from the target.

In some cases the target may become so damaged that log recovery is considered impractical. The target was then reset to a clean state, ready for the next test.

#### ■ 7.4 Threat introduction

Malicious websites were visited in real-time using the web browser. This risky behavior was conducted using live internet connections. URLs were typed manually into the browser.

Web-hosted malware often changes over time. Visiting the same site over a short period of time can expose systems to what appear to be a range of threats (although it may be the same threat, slightly altered to avoid detection).

Also, many infected sites will only attack a particular IP address once, which makes it hard to test more than one product against the same threat.

In order to improve the chances that each target system received the same experience from a malicious web server, we used a web replay system.

When the verification target systems visited a malicious site, the page's content, including malicious code, was downloaded, stored and loaded into the replay system. When each target

system subsequently visited the site, it received exactly the same content.

The network configurations were set to allow all products unfettered access to the internet throughout the test, regardless of the web replay systems.

#### ■ 7.5 Observation and intervention

Throughout each test, the target system was observed both manually and in real-time. This enabled the tester to take comprehensive notes about the system's perceived behavior, as well as to compare visual alerts with the products' log entries.

At certain stages the tester was required to act as a regular user. To achieve consistency, the tester followed a policy for handling certain situations, including dealing with pop-ups displayed by products or the operating system, system crashes, invitations by malware to perform tasks and so on.

This user behavior policy included the following directives:

1. Act naively. Allow the threat a good chance to introduce itself to the target by clicking OK to malicious prompts, for example.
2. Don't be too stubborn in retrying blocked downloads. If a product warns against visiting a site, don't take further measures to visit that site.
3. Where malware is downloaded as a Zip file, or similar, extract it to the Desktop then attempt to run it. If the archive is protected by a password, and that password is known to you (e.g. it was included in the body of the original malicious email), use it.
4. Always click the default option. This applies to security product pop-ups, operating system prompts (including Windows firewall) and malware invitations to act.
5. If there is no default option, wait. Give the prompt 20 seconds to choose a course of action automatically.
6. If no action is taken automatically, choose the first option. Where options are listed vertically, choose the top one. Where options are listed horizontally, choose the left-hand one.

## ■ 7.6 Remediation

When a target is exposed to malware, the threat may have a number of opportunities to infect the system. The security product also has a number of chances to protect the target. The snapshots explained in 7.3 *Test stages* on page 14 provided information that was used to analyze a system's final state at the end of a test.

Before, during and after each test, a 'snapshot' of the target system was taken to provide information about what had changed during the exposure to malware. For example, comparing a snapshot taken before a malicious website was visited to one taken after might highlight new entries in the Registry and new files on the hard disk.

Snapshots were also used to determine how effective a product was at removing a threat that had managed to establish itself on the target system. This analysis gives an indication as to the levels of protection that a product has provided.

These levels of protection have been recorded using three main terms: *defended*, *neutralized*, and *compromised*. A threat that was unable to gain a foothold on the target was *defended* against; one that was prevented from continuing its activities was *neutralized*; while a successful threat was considered to have *compromised* the target.

A *defended* incident occurs where no malicious activity is observed with the naked eye or third-party monitoring tools following the initial threat introduction. The snapshot report files are used to verify this happy state.

If a threat is observed to run actively on the system, but not beyond the point where an on-demand scan is run, it is considered to have been *neutralized*.

Comparing the snapshot reports should show that malicious files were created and Registry entries were made after the introduction. However, as long as the 'scanned' snapshot report shows that either the files have been removed or the Registry entries have been deleted, the threat has been *neutralized*.

The target is *compromised* if malware is observed to run after the on-demand scan. In some cases a product might request a further scan to complete the removal. We considered secondary scans to

be acceptable, but continual scan requests may be ignored after no progress is determined.

An edited 'hosts' file or altered system file also counted as a compromise.

## ■ 7.7 Automatic monitoring

Logs were generated using third-party applications, as well as by the security products themselves.

Manual observation of the target system throughout its exposure to malware (and legitimate applications) provided more information about the security products' behavior.

Monitoring was performed directly on the target system and on the network.

### Client-side logging

A combination of Process Explorer, Process Monitor, TcpView and Wireshark were used to monitor the target systems. Regshot was used between each testing stage to record a system snapshot.

A number of Dennis Technology Labs-created scripts were also used to provide additional system information. Each product was able to generate some level of logging itself.

Process Explorer and TcpView were run throughout the tests, providing a visual cue to the tester about possible malicious activity on the system. In addition, Wireshark's real-time output, and the display from the web proxy (see Network logging, below), indicated specific network activity such as secondary downloads.

Process Monitor also provided valuable information to help reconstruct malicious incidents.

### Network logging

All target systems were connected to a live internet connection, which incorporated a transparent web proxy and a network monitoring system. All traffic to and from the internet had to pass through this system.

An HTTP replay system ensured that all target systems received the same malware as each other. It was configured to allow access to the internet so that products could download updates and communicate with any available 'in the cloud' servers.



## 8. CONCLUSIONS

### ■ **Where are the threats?**

The threats used in this test were genuine, real-life threats that were infecting victims globally at the time that we tested the products.

The types of infected or malicious sites were varied, which demonstrates that effective anti-virus software is essential for those who want to use the web using a Windows PC.

Most threats installed automatically when a user visited the infected webpage. This infection was often invisible to a casual observer.

### ■ **Where does protection start?**

There were a significant number of compromises in this test, as well as a relatively large number of neutralizations.

The strongest products blocked the site before it was even able to deliver its payload. The weakest tended to handle the threat after it had started to interact with the target system.

### ■ **Sorting the wheat from the chaff**

Symantec Endpoint Protection Enterprise Edition and Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Windows scored joint highest in terms of malware protection, with McAfee's bundle of software following fast in third place.

The products from Symantec and Kaspersky Lab gained the highest protection ratings because they prevented all threats from infecting the target.

McAfee's product allowed two threats to compromise the system, while Trend Micro's failed to stop five.

Microsoft System Security Center Endpoint Protection did so poorly at preventing the threats that its protection rating dropped below zero. This is because it failed to prevent 47 threats from compromising the system.

Anti-malware products need to be able to distinguish between malicious and non-malicious programs. This is where some products failed to excel and McAfee's product was particularly distracting and inaccurate.

McAfee VirusScan, HIPs and SiteAdvisor blocked six programs automatically and recommended blocking a further one.

In contrast, products from Kaspersky Lab and Microsoft were 100 per cent accurate when handling legitimate software. This boosted their overall accuracy ratings but, in Microsoft's case, not enough to save it from last place overall.

Overall, considering each product's ability to handle both malware and legitimate applications, the clear winners were Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Windows and Symantec Endpoint Protection Enterprise Edition. Both win AAA awards.

### ■ **Anti-virus is important (but not a panacea)**

This test shows that with even a relatively small sample set of 100 threats there is a significant difference in performance between the anti-virus programs. Most importantly, it illustrates this difference using real threats that attacked real computers at the time of testing.

The average protection level of the tested products is 89 per cent (see 3. *Protection Scores* on page 8). This figure is much lower than some detection results typically quoted in anti-malware marketing material.

The presence of anti-malware software can be seen to decrease the chances of a malware infection even when the only sites being visited are proven to be actively malicious. That said, only two products produced a 100 per cent protection rate, while three mishandled legitimate software.

## APPENDIX A: TERMS USED

Compromised	Malware continues to run on an infected system, even after an on-demand scan.
Defended	Malware was prevented from running on, or making changes to, the target.
False Positive	A legitimate application was incorrectly classified as being malicious.
Introduction	Test stage where a target system is exposed to a threat.
Neutralized	Malware or exploit was able to run on the target, but was then removed by the security product.
Observation	Test stage during which malware may affect the target.
On-demand (protection)	Manual 'virus' scan, run by the user at an arbitrary time.
Prompt	Questions asked by software, including malware, security products and the operating system. With security products, prompts usually appear in the form of pop-up windows. Some prompts don't ask questions but provide alerts. When these appear and disappear without a user's interaction, they are called 'toasters'.
Real-time (protection)	The 'always-on' protection offered by many security products.
Remediation	Test stage that measures a product's abilities to remove any installed threat.
Round	Test series of multiple products, exposing each target to the same threat.
Snapshot	Record of a target's file system and Registry contents.
Target	Test system exposed to threats in order to monitor the behavior of security products.
Threat	A program or other measure designed to subvert a system.
Update	Code provided by a vendor to keep its software up to date. This includes virus definitions, engine updates and operating system patches.

## APPENDIX B: FAQs

- This test was unsponsored.
- The test rounds were conducted between 18th October 2014 and 11th November 2014 using the most up to date versions of the software available on any given day.
- All products were able to communicate with their back-end systems over the internet.
- The products selected for this test were chosen by Dennis Technology Labs.
- Samples were located and verified by Dennis Technology Labs.
- Products were exposed to threats within 24 hours of the same threats being verified. In practice there was only a delay of up to three to four hours.
- Details of the samples, including their URLs and code, were provided to partner vendors only after the test was complete.
- The sample set comprised 100 actively-malicious URLs and 100 legitimate applications and URLs.

Do participating vendors know what samples are used, before or during the test?

No. We don't even know what threats will be used until the test starts. Each day we find new ones, so it is impossible for us to give this information before the test starts. Neither do we disclose this information until the test has concluded.

What is the difference between a vendor and a partner vendor?

Partner vendors contribute financially to the test in return for a preview of the results, an opportunity to challenge results before publication and the right to use award logos in marketing material. Other participants first see the results on the day of publication and may not use award logos for any purpose.

Do you share samples with the vendors?

Partner vendors are able to download samples from us after the test is complete.

Other vendors may request a small subset of the threats that compromised their products in order for them to verify our results and further understand our methodology. The same applies to client-side logs, including the network capture files. There is a small administration fee for the provision of this service.

What is a sample?

In our tests a sample is not simply a set of malicious executable files that runs on the system. A sample is an entire replay archive that enables researchers to replicate the incident, even if the original infected website is no longer available. This means that it is possible to reproduce the attack and to determine which layer of protection was able to bypass. Replaying the attack should, in most cases, produce the relevant executable files. If not, these are usually available in the client-side network capture (pcap) file.

## APPENDIX C: PRODUCT VERSIONS

A product's update mechanism may upgrade the software to a new version automatically so the version used at the start of the test may be different to that used at the end.

Vendor	Product	Build
Kaspersky	Endpoint Security for Windows	10.2.1.23(a)
McAfee	VirusScan, HIPS and SiteAdvisor	8.0.0.2482
Microsoft	System Center Endpoint Protection	4.1.522.0
Symantec	Symantec Endpoint Protection Enterprise Edition	12.1.5212.5000
Trend Micro	OfficeScan; Intrusion Defense Firewall	11.0.1028

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